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This paper investigates whether the institutional affiliation of a collateralized loan obligation 
(CLO) manager influences the manager’s access to information and risk appetite. We find that 
CLO managers affiliated with banks start to sell off their positions in loans arranged by their 
bank well before the onset of default. In contrast, CLO managers affiliated with nonbanks do not 
lower their exposures to distressed loans. These findings are consistent with bank-affiliated CLO 
managers being more risk averse, but they could also derive from them having access to valuable 
information. On close inspection, we find that although bank-affiliated CLO managers are averse 
to holding any distressed loans, they are also more aggressive at divesting distressed loans 
arranged by their parent bank, suggesting that they benefit from an information wedge. Besides 
helping us understand CLO managers’ trading activities, our findings highlight a potential limit 
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Securitization has considerably changed the intermediation of corporate credit with the advent of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). Over time, 
banks increasingly used these structures to advance their “originate to distribute” approach to 
lending (Cetorelli and Peristiani 2012). The volume of securitization came to a halt during the 
financial crisis with the collapse of the subprime MBS sector. However, in contrast with non-
agency MBS, CLO issuance has gradually recovered and remains a significant source of 
corporate credit funding.1  
Despite the considerable volume of corporate loans outstanding in CLOs, we still know very 
little about the way CLO managers administer their loan portfolios.2 In this paper, we investigate 
whether the institutional affiliation of a CLO manager influences the manager’s risk appetite and 
access to information. CLO managers typically have a “parent” financial institution. While 
managers affiliated with banks may be more risk conservative because their parent organizations 
are less risk prone by virtue of being subject to prudential regulation and supervision, we are 
particularly interested in finding out whether an affiliation with a bank that arranges loans in the 
syndicated loan market is a source of valuable information for the CLO manager. 
All syndicate participants, including CLOs, receive borrower information on a regular basis 
describing their financial performance and covenant compliance. However, loan arrangers, 
tasked with monitoring the borrower, compile useful private financial information throughout the 
duration of their relationship with the borrowing firm (Petersen 2004). Therefore, CLO managers 
affiliated with banks may have access to private information with regard to their investments in 
those loans that were arranged by their affiliated bank.   
                                                          
1 The recent rebound of CLO issuance is discussed more extensively in Peristiani and Santos (2015).  




We investigate that premise by analyzing CLO managers’ trading activity in the year leading 
up to their default. We focus on trading during this time period because private information is 
more valuable during turbulent periods, and as we will see, there is a significant price decline in 
the secondary loan market during the year leading up to the loan default. 
We start by identifying CLO managers affiliated with banks that are lead arrangers in the 
syndicated loan market. We also consider other potential tiers of private information stemming 
from syndicate participations or the CLO underwriter. Since CLO underwriters can also serve as 
syndicate lead arrangers, they can potentially act as an alternative channel of private information 
to CLO managers. The flow of information from an underwriter, however, is unlikely to be as 
strong as that from the CLO parent bank when the two entities are not part of the same 
organization. 
We classify all CLOs’ loan positions into four mutually exclusive types of relationship to the 
CLO manager: (1) arranger relationship: loans arranged by the bank that is affiliated with the 
CLO manager, (2) underwriter relationship: loans arranged by the CLO underwriter, (3) 
participant relationship: loans participated in by the CLO manager/parent or its underwriter, and 
(4) no relationship: loans neither arranged by nor participated in by the CLO manager or its 
underwriter. 
Our regression results reveal no significant decrease in CLO managers’ holdings of 
distressed no-relationship loans and only minor changes in CLOs’ holdings with indirect 
relationships with the arranger of distressed loans. In contrast, CLO managers affiliated with the 
arrangers of the distressed loans start to sell off their positions well before the onset of default.  
These results are robust. They continue to hold when we include CLO fixed effects in 
addition to borrower fixed effects, and when we restrict our analysis to defaulting loans held only 
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in the portfolios of CLOs affiliated with loan arrangers, an approach that mitigates sample 
selection bias. They also remain unchanged when we limit the sample to single-loan positions to 
reduce the potential mismatch of aggregating multiple loan securities for a given borrower. 
Further, our empirical findings are robust to different time windows around the event of default.   
Our evidence that CLO managers affiliated with arrangers of distressed loans start to sell off 
their positions well before the onset of default is consistent with the idea that this affiliation 
provides access to valuable information. However, because these affiliations are predominantly 
with banks, which are the dominant arrangers in the syndicated loan market, this finding raises 
the prospect of an alternative explanation. If CLO managers affiliated with banks are more 
sensitive to risk, they would be more likely to dispose of distressed assets. Implicit in this idea is 
the assumption that such an association could expose the parent organization to scrutiny, thereby 
compromising its brand and ability to market securities to institutional clients (Brown 2007). The 
parent organization could also face several perils from badly performing CLOs: litigation risks, 
regulatory risks, negative investor reaction, and loss of business from clients. These problems are 
likely exacerbated in the case of parent banks because of their low-risk appetite given they are 
subject to prudential regulation and supervision. 
We attempt to disentangle the importance of private information and institutional factors. We 
start by comparing the pre-default trading of bank-affiliated and nonbank-affiliated CLO 
managers on borrowers that they have no loan relationships with, thus removing private-
information biases. In this case, bank and nonbank affiliated CLO managers essentially depend 
on available public sources and syndicated loan reports provided by an unaffiliated lead arranger. 
Although they use similar information, we find that bank-affiliated CLO managers are more 
active in selling distressed loans, adding to the idea that bank-affiliated CLO managers are more 
risk conservative.  
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To ascertain whether there is a separate information effect, in our final test we compare CLO 
managers’ trading on distressed loans arranged by their affiliated bank with their trading on 
distressed loans arranged by other banks. This comparison reveals that CLO managers are more 
proactive in divesting their banks’ arranged distressed loans than other unaffiliated arranged 
distressed positions. This result adds important support to the thesis that CLOs affiliated with 
banks gain access to valuable information on the loans arranged by their parent institutions. This 
finding is important for yet another reason: it reduces concerns that the differences in CLOs’ 
loan positions over time that we unveil derive from differences in loan valuations as opposed to 
trading activity.  
Despite the critical role that CLOs play in corporate loan securitizations, researchers to date 
have paid limited attention to the management of these financial vehicles and focused instead on 
other issues.3 The paper in the literature closest to ours is probably Lou, Loumioti, and Vasvari 
(2014), which examines the influence of private information on CLO performance. Their 
findings suggest that CLO managers have access to private information that they use to trade 
strategically to boost performance. Lou et al. infers whether CLO managers have access to 
private information through a proxy variable computed from a model that attempts to control for 
all available public information sources of loan trading. In contrast, we rely on the affiliation of 
CLO managers with banks to ascertain whether they have access to private information.  
In addition, we consider the importance that bank-specific factors, such as their franchise 
value, may have on their affiliated CLOs. In this regard, our paper shares some similarities with 
Chernenko (2017). Using a large sample of ABS CDOs issued during 2002-2007, Chernenko 
finds that specialized CDO managers invested in low quality securities underwritten by the 
                                                          
3 These include the rapid growth of CLOs (Bord and Santos 2012; Guo and Zhang 2015), the impact of 
securitization on the cost of bank credit (Nadauld and Weisbach 2014 and Bord and Santos 2015), the performance 
of securitized corporate loans (Shivdasani and Wang 2011; Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina 2012; Bord and 
Santos 2015 ), and the ability of borrowers to renegotiate their loans (Paligorova and Santos 2016). 
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CDO's arranger and were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments. In 
contrast, diversified CDO managers did not engage in such practices, possibly out of concern 
with the franchise value of their other businesses. Like Chernenko, we are interested in the 
importance of affiliations for managers of securitization vehicles. His focus is on ascertaining 
whether reputational concerns lead diversified CDO managers to make better investment 
decisions. We too consider the impact that the reputation of the parent institution may have on 
affiliated CLOs, but our focus is on ascertaining whether an affiliation with a bank active in the 
syndicated loan market is a source of valuable information for the CLO manager.   
Finally, our paper is related to those studies, including Massoud et. al (2009), Ivashina and 
Sun (2011) and Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), which have documented that 
investors use the private information they obtain while participating in the syndicated loan 
market to trade in other markets. Our paper expands this literature by focusing on CLO 
managers, an increasingly important player in the syndicated loan market.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the motivation for our 
analysis and lays out our hypothesis. Section 3 presents our data and methodology and describes 
the CLO sample. Sections 4-5 report and discuss our findings on the impact of CLO managers’ 
affiliation with banks on their trading activities in the year leading up to borrower default. 
Section 6 concludes with some final remarks. 
2. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
The key player in a CLO structure is the collateral manager (or CLO manager), who is tasked 
with assembling the CLO portfolio and managing collateral risks throughout the life of the CLO. 
The collateral of a cash-flow CLO consists mainly of business loans (syndicated term loans), but 
it may include a small fraction of corporate bonds and other asset-backed securities.  
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During the buildup phase, the CLO manager enlists an underwriter (CLO underwriter), who 
takes on the traditional responsibilities of assessing investor interest, selling the securities, and 
providing liquidity support. The underwriter may also facilitate the buildup of the portfolio by 
offering the manager the option of purchasing loans from a warehouse facility, a purchase often 
financed with a bridge credit arrangement. The underwriter, in turn, engages a rating agency to 
determine the seniority tranche structure of the deal and issues the securities (CLO notes and an 
equity tranche) to investors. The seniority guidelines of the CLO specify how proceeds from 
principal and interest payments are distributed.  
After the ramp-up period, the CLO enters the reinvestment phase, which is followed by 
amortization. During the reinvestment phase, which ranges from 3 to 5 years, CLO managers 
reinvest interest proceeds and principal repayments; they also trade assets to realize capital gains, 
take advantage of good investment opportunities, or avoid potential credit risks. In the 
amortization period, the cash flows are used mainly to pay down the security notes.  
CLO managers usually receive a fixed management fee plus a contingent fee paid only after 
the equity tranche achieves a certain hurdle rate.4 The latter fee incentivizes managers to deliver 
a minimum level of returns to the investors in the equity tranche.  
CLO managers are bound by a number of operational constraints. In general, they can trade 
only up to 20 percent of the portfolio’s par value each year. They must also meet certain 
compliance tests (for instance, an overcollateralization asset-liability threshold) and covenants 
established to protect investors. However, CLO managers appear to have developed ways to 
circumvent some of these rules. For instance, Loumioti and Vasvari (2016) note that, to avoid 
                                                          
4 The manager receives a portion of its fixed fee before the most senior tranche of debt receives a return or is paid, 
and it receives the remainder of the fee after the debt tranches are paid but before the equity tranche is paid. 
8 
 
violating overcollateralization requirements, CLO managers often inflate the fair market value of 
loan assets and prefer to rebalance their portfolio by selling high-quality assets. 
Finally, CLO managers are usually affiliated with a bank or a nonbank financial institution 
such as a hedge fund, private equity firm, or insurance firm. As we argue below, the type of 
institution the CLO manager is affiliated with is important because it may affect the information 
available to the manager and possibly its risk-taking incentives.   
2.1 The Effect of Affiliation on Availability of Information  
Arrangers in the syndicated loan market are responsible for collecting detailed financial 
information on borrowing firms and for monitoring their compliance with covenants, including 
their financial performance obligations, and they are expected to regularly share that information 
with syndicate members.  
Arrangers also have access to additional information on borrowers that is not shared with 
other syndicate members. As noted by Petersen (2004), arrangers gather a good deal of private 
qualitative information—personal observations, evaluations, viewpoints, and opinions compiled 
by the borrowers’ loan officers over the length of the lender-borrower relationship. This 
information is important to the understanding of large, complex entities as well as to the 
evaluation of smaller, less transparent firms. But as “soft,” impressionistic information, it is 
difficult to transfer to other parties and therefore has the potential to create an informational 
wedge between arrangers and syndicate participants.  
The relationship between borrowers and lenders is bound by confidentiality agreements. For 
example, the monthly financial loan disclosures, projections, and other financial information 
certifying the borrower is compliant must remain out of the public domain.5 However, the rapid 
                                                          




growth of the secondary loan market over the past decade has attracted nonbank and unregulated 
investors and blurred the limits on the disclosure of private information.  
This changing landscape of the syndicated loan market has significantly altered the diffusion 
of information among market participants. A 2011 report by Standard and Poor’s highlighting a 
rise in loan price volatility in the secondary market supports anecdotal evidence that nonbank 
syndicate participants trade on private information. A number of academic studies also find 
empirical support for that assertion. For example, Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2011) find that price discovery is faster in loans with covenant violations (which are disclosed 
to syndicate members) and document a stock price reaction to these private disclosures. Massoud 
et. al (2009) argue that investors benefit from using insider information obtained from 
participating in syndicated loan activities and renegotiations.   
When CLO managers invest in a loan they will gain access to the financial reports available 
to all members of the syndicate. Further, because loan arrangers have access to additional 
proprietary borrower information, it follows that CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers 
may also be privy to that unique information, which they can use to enhance their trading 
activities. This gives us our main testable hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers have access to private 
information.  
3. METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND SAMPLE CHARACTERIZATION 
3.1 Methodology  
We attempt to ascertain whether CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers gain access to 
private information by investigating their trading activity around the time of loan defaults. The 
default event offers us a good opportunity to investigate our hypothesis because it triggers the 
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release of important information on borrowers. Figure 1 documents the change in price for 
defaulted loans traded in the secondary loan market.6 The figure traces the average loan price 
250 trading days before and after default for a balanced sample. To facilitate the comparison 
across loans, we normalize the price at the time of default (t=0) to equal 100. As we can see from 
the figure, there is a monotonic decline in the secondary loan prices of distressed loans up until 
the event of default at which time loan prices appear to stabilize, highlighting the importance of 
trading in the period leading up to the default.  
The next step in our methodology is the definition of a measure of CLO trading activity. Let 
tijP denote CLO (j) investment in loan (i) at month (t), with the monthly time indicator ranging 
from t=0, the origination month, until T.  A common measure of trading activity for loan (i) is 
given by the change in holdings, or tijP∆ , representing month-to-month changes.
7 A better 
estimate of the cumulative trading activity is given by tij tij 0ijR P P ,= where 0ijP  represents the 
initial investment. We formally refer to tijR as the investment ratio of CLO (j) in loan (i) at month 
(t).8  We set the investment ratio at 100 percent at (t=0).  
Finally, we use a straightforward regression specification to analyze CLO managers’ trading 
around default. We assume that a CLO investment ratio in a borrower tijR is a function of the 
borrower characteristics, the structure of the CLO, and a set of CLO-manager-specific factors. 
More precisely, we use the following trading model: 
H H H H
B CLO M M P P U U N
tij t i 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h tij
h H h H h H h H
R x x Rel Rel Rel NORel .• •
=− =− =− =−
= α +α +β +β + δ + δ + δ + δ + e∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1) 
                                                          
6 We thank Pei Shao for providing us with the pricing information on defaulted loans from LSTA used in Figure 1.  
7 CLO managers also invest a small fraction of their portfolio in corporate bonds and other asset-backed securities. 
Our analysis, however, focuses only on the more important loan assets. 
8 We explored alternative measures of trading activity, such as the simple change tijP∆ and tij tij 0ijtR P P= ∆∑ . 
Overall, the regression analysis results were very similar. 
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The vector Btijx • includes publicly available borrower-specific variables that vary over time such as 
the borrower’s monthly credit rating, while the vector CLOtjx • includes CLO-specific explanatory 
variables, such as the size of the CLO facility. In a number of specifications, the vector CLOtjx • is 
replaced by CLO fixed affects. The controls tα and iα represent year and borrower fixed effects, 
respectively. 
Key to our analysis is the set of dummy variables we specify to identify whether the CLO 
manager has a relationship with the various sources of information on borrowers of defaulting 
loans (h) months from the time of default. For simplicity, we assume that h -H,…,0,…,H= , 
where (h 0)=  represents the month of the default event. We consider three possible sources of 




tji,hRel . The dummy variable
M
tji,hRel  indicates whether the CLO manager is affiliated with the arranger of the defaulting loan, 
U
tji,hRel  indicates whether the CLO underwriter was the arranger of the defaulting loan, and 
P
tji,hRel controls for whether the CLO underwriter or the CLO manager were participants in the 
syndicate of the defaulting loan at the time of the loan origination.  
Arguably, the indicator Mtji,hRel  captures the instances in which the CLO manager can obtain 
the most insightful and valuable soft information about the borrower. The two other possible 
relationships, Utji,hRel and 
P
tji,hRel , represent the intermediate case in which the CLO manager 
could get access to loan information through indirect channels. 
We complement these variables with the dummy variable tji,hNORel , which captures the 
cases where the CLO manager (and its bank underwriter) neither is affiliated with the arranger of 
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the defaulting loan nor was a participant in the loan syndication. In this case, the CLO manager 
only receives the reports from an unaffiliated arranger after it starts its investment on the loan.9  
That set of indicator variables, together with the parameter estimates of hιδ , tells us the 
incremental change in the investment ratio (h) months before the event of default by the 
corresponding information relationship group ( )ι . For example, a value of 5 for hιδ  corresponds 
to a 5 percent increase from the initial (t 0)=  position; the actual change from, say, a 140 percent 
investment ratio at month (h 1)−  is 5/140, or 3.57 percent.  
We consider two testable predictions from our hypothesis that CLO managers affiliated with 
loan arrangers gain access to more information and therefore are better able to respond to distress 
before default: 
HYPOTHESIS 1A: CLO managers affiliated with the arranger of the defaulting loan are able to 
divest from that loan before default. This premise can be statistically tested by maintained 
hypothesis 0 BH : 0ιδ ≤ , where 
H
B hh 1
[ / H]−ι ι
=−
δ = δ∑  such that M, Uι = , P.  
HYPOTHESIS 1B: The sell-off before default of distressed loans by CLO managers affiliated 
with the arranger of that loan is greater than the sell-off by remaining CLO managers. We test 
this premise by M U0 B BH : δ ≤ δ , M P0 B BH : δ ≤ δ or M N0 B BH : δ ≤ δ .  
                                                          
9 CLO managers typically purchase a loan from a warehouse facility or from the secondary market. Once the loan 
is added to the CLO portfolio, the collateral manager becomes a member of the syndicate and is qualified to receive 
monthly reports and updates detailing the borrower’s financial condition and capacity to meet loan covenant 
conditions. There is, however, a subtle difference between tji,hNORel and 
P
tji,hRel . In the case of tji,hNORel the 
source of information stems from customary reports available to all syndicate members (including Ptji,hRel ) 
throughout the life of the loan. In the case of Ptji,hRel , CLO managers could gain additional insights because they are 




We complement the investigation of these predictions with a series of tests which aim at 
ascertaining alternative explanations for our findings, in particular the possibility that bank-
affiliated CLO managers are more risk conservative. 
3.2 Data Sources 
To investigate our hypotheses regarding the impact of CLO managers’ affiliations on their 
trading decisions, we start by gathering information from Moody’s CDO Services database on 
the composition of CLO investment portfolios over time. 
The Moody’s database reports portfolio positions compiled from monthly trustee reports. 
Because this database does not contain unique loan security identifiers, we aggregate all CLO 
portfolio security positions at the borrower level. This does not significantly alter the structure of 
portfolios because nearly 80 percent of the CLO positions have only one investment per 
borrower. This aggregation gives us the opportunity to trace in a consistent way the changes in 
the CLOs’ total notional value invested in each borrower over time.10 
The Moody’s database also provides extensive information on CLO managers and 
underwriters. This information is critical for our goal of understanding the impact of the 
relationships between the CLO manager and other players in the securitization chain. We 
complement these data with information from Capital IQ and Dealscan to ascertain the nature of 
the relationship between the CLO manager and the members of the syndicate in each loan in the 
CLO portfolio of collateral.  
3.3 Sample Characterization 
                                                          
10 Collateral managers often swap loan securities from the same borrower. Sometimes the replacement results from 
an exchange, redemption, or restructuring and is thus nondiscretionary. In other instances, however, managers may 
prefer a security from the same borrower with better features, such as longer duration and higher seniority. None of 
these security replacements contribute to turnover in our borrower-specific information.  
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Our sample consists of 239 CLOs originated between 2007 and 2011 as arbitrage cash flow 
or small- to medium-market CLOs.11 We exclude synthetic transactions that derive their cash 
flow from credit default swaps and are therefore not actively managed. The average original face 
value of the sample CLOs is $485 million (Table 1). Our CLOs are invested in more than 5,000 
borrowers with about 65,000 unique CLO-borrower positions. The overall number of 
observations in the CLO-borrower panel is about 1.47 million.  
CLO managers are affiliated with five broad categories of financial institutions: banks, 
insurance firms, hedge funds, private equity firms, and investment asset-manager firms. Table 1 
reveals a significant heterogeneity among CLO managers. Importantly for our purposes, 55 of 
the 239 CLO managers are affiliated with banks. Equally important, a default occurs during the 
sample period (2007–11) in more than 20 percent of the borrowers in which the CLOs invest.12  
Figure 2 shows CLO managers’ trading activity over the first four years of the CLO’s life. 
During the ramp-up period (the first six months), the investment ratio varies significantly for all 
types of managers’ affiliations. Recall that, by definition, the investment ratio is 100 percent at 
(t=0).  The greater variance during the ramp-up period is not unusual because managers are 
building up their portfolios from scratch. To exclude the initial trading volatility and its impact 
on tijR , we omit the ramp-up phase of trading in our regression analysis. 
As we can see from Figure 2, CLO managers continue to trade actively well beyond the 
ramp-up period, with the average investment ratio slowly rising from around 110 percent at t=18 
                                                          
11 Small- to medium-market CLOs are a minor specialized segment of structured corporate debt products typically 
backed by loans to small and medium-size enterprises. 
12 We use information from several sources to ascertain corporate default. The trustee reports compiled by Moody’s 
identify borrowers that defaulted. In addition, Moody’s separately provides its own assessment of whether a 
borrower defaulted. We complemented these main sources of default information by identifying (1) distressed 
borrowers assigned a D rating by any credit rating agency and (2) firms that filed for bankruptcy (Capital IQ). As a 
final check, we manually investigated the entire sample of borrowers using Capital IQ’s corporate timeline to verify 
the sequence of insolvency events. The onset of firm distress is defined as the first occurrence of insolvency reported 
in the trustee reports, the Moody’s database, and bankruptcy information. 
15 
 
to around 140 percent at t=36. The trading pattern naturally varies over the CLO lifecycle.13 For 
a sample of arbitrage cash-flow CLOs similar to the present sample, Peristiani and Santos (2015) 
estimate the average monthly buying turnover (relative to assets) over the 2007–11 period to be 
about 5.5 percent (corresponding to a 66.5 percent annual rate). After the ramp-up period, 
managers become more active sellers as they seek to replace some of the original temporary 
holdings. Importantly, although part of the position turnover stems from loan repayments and 
renegotiations, most of the buying and selling is discretionary. 
Table 2 summarizes the control variables of our regression analysis. As noted earlier, a small 
portion of the collateral in a typical cash-flow CLO consists of corporate bonds and occasionally 
other structured securities. Given the focus on evaluating the importance of private syndicate 
information, we restrict the analysis to loan positions, which constitute the bulk of the collateral. 
The average investment ratio for the regression sample is about 137 percent. In some extreme 
cases, in which the initial holdings are very small, the investment ratio can be much larger. We 
mitigate the impact of these outliers by winsorizing the investment ratio, as well as other 
explanatory variables in the regression, at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The average position in each borrower is around $3.81 million, with the 99th percentile at 
$25.75 million. The relatively small nominal positions and narrow range show that CLOs are 
well diversified. Indeed, on average, they hold investments in about 160 borrowers. The median 
volume-weighted maturity in our sample of loans is 4 years. About 95 percent of the borrowers 
in the portfolios are domiciled in United States (US _ FIRM) . Finally, the average borrower 
credit rating is B+. This masks the true credit quality risk because more than 47 percent of the 
borrowers fall in the range of B+ to B–.  
                                                          
13 In theory, a CLO with fully invested proceeds must sell securities in its portfolios to reinvest. Typically, before 
CLOs enter the reinvestment period, CLO buying precedes selling as collateral managers accumulate positions.    
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The bottom panel of Table 2 summarizes the relationships between the CLO manager, its 
underwriter, and the borrowing firm for each loan in the CLO portfolio. Close to 67 percent of 
CLO borrowers have no affiliation with either the manager or underwriter because typically the 
portfolios are compiled from various loan warehouse facilities; moreover, a lot of the CLO 
collateral consists of smaller low-rated firms with a limited history of syndicated loan issuance. 
The remaining segment of borrowers, however, has an information relationship with the manager 
or the underwriter of the CLO allowing us to empirically test our maintained hypotheses. 
CLO underwriters were the arrangers in 11 percent of the loan investments in our sample. 
For 19 percent of the investments the CLO manager has a relationship only via its participation 
in the syndicate or via the participation of its underwriter Ptji,h(Rel ) . CLO managers have the most 
informative link with borrowers when they are affiliated with the arranger of the loan, which 
occurs for 3 percent of the CLO investments.  
Table 3 decomposes the sample of CLO-borrower holdings for the subset of firms that 
defaulted by the type of manager, which forms the basis of our regression sample. This table 
reveals that the small fraction loans with arranger relationships ( Mtji,hRel ) is dominated by banks 
that are responsible for nearly 94 percent of these syndicated loans. 
4.  DETERMINANTS OF CLO TRADING 
The regression model defined by equation (1) outlines several determining factors for the 
trading activities of CLO managers; our primary focus, however, is on their affiliation with 
arrangers of loans around their default date.  One way to estimate equation (1) is to use the entire 
panel encompassing all CLO× borrower observations for all possible monthly observations 
before and after default. This approach is not very practical because the monthly panel of 
distressed borrowers is distributed asymmetrically around default. For example, in about 10 
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percent of the borrower defaults, CLOs have no previous exposure to the borrower; rather, in 
those cases, the CLO manager purchased the loan after the borrower defaulted. These uneven 
investment patterns introduce sample-selection biases because the investment strategies of 
managers before default would differ from those after default.  
To better balance these investment incentives, we start by focusing on defaults for which 
CLOs had a minimum of 6-months’ investment history before the default date. A potential 
concern with this time horizon is that it leaves out investments for which CLOs sold off their 
entire positions before the 6-month date. This is a valid concern because as we saw in Figure 1, 
loan prices start to decline more than 6 months ahead of the default date. To address this 
concern, we also investigate a fully balanced sample focusing on defaults for which a CLO 
manager had purchased the loan a minimum of 12-months before the default date. 
4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1: The Importance of Private-Information Relationships 
We begin with a graphical overview of CLO managers’ responses to borrower distress, that is, 
the in-sample regression investment-ratio predictions for the loan-relationship alternatives 
(Figure 3). This graphical evidence tracing the response to private information offers a useful 
summary of CLO managers’ trading activities around default.  
The investment ratio forecast for the relationship between the loan arranger and the CLO 
manager is calculated for the average borrower in the sample, defined more formally as
B CLO
h i j t 1 2 h h
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆR x xι ι ι= α +α +α +β +β + δ = µ + δ . The estimates iα and tα represent the average 
regression for borrower fixed-effects and time effects, respectively. The first five components of 
the investment ratio forecast represent the average-response baseline µ̂ ; the extant impact of the 
private-information relationships is determined by the corresponding hˆ
ιδ deviation coefficients.  
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As we can see from Figure 3, when CLO managers have no relationships with defaulting 
borrowers ( tijNORel 1= ), there does not appear to be any significant trading during the year 
leading up to the default. For CLO managers with an indirect relationship with defaulting 
borrowers, either via their underwriter or through the CLO participation in the loan syndicate (
P
tji,hRel 1= or 
U
tji,hRel 1= ), we observe only about a small percent decline in distressed loans before 
default. However, when CLO managers are affiliated with the arranger of the defaulting loan
M
tji,h(Rel 1)= , they gradually lower their investment ratio in the distressed loan starting about one 
year before default. By the time of default, these managers have reduced their exposure by 14 
percent.  
Although the difference in trading for the CLOs affiliated with loan arrangers is quite 
distinct, it is not drastic, and on average managers do not totally dispose of the defaulted loan. 
Arguably, one could expect these better-informed CLO managers to judiciously divest these 
problem assets. However, we find that the median position held for these CLOs declines from 
$3.27 million 12 months before default to $2 million at the time of default, and they completely 
selloff the fifth percentile of their distressed positions.  Further, we find that the divestment of 
“problem” positions is sensitive to their size, with CLO managers more eager to sell larger 
holdings. 
There are many factors that would affect a manager’s propensity to trade. As noted, CLOs 
are fairly diversified, allowing for some leeway in how managers dispose of problem loans. In 
contrast to equity securities, which suffer severe losses in the event of default, the resolution of 
distressed syndicated loans is more dynamic and complex, often involving renegotiations and 
restructurings that do not always warrant a prompt selloff. For example, as we can see from 
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Figure 1, the secondary price of distressed loans does not collapse; it declines from about 86 one 
year before default to 62 at the day of default.  
The differences between CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers and the remaining 
CLO managers depicted in Figure 3 appear to be large. However, it is unclear from that figure 
whether these differences are statistically significant. To that end, we present in Table 4 the 
regression results determining the effect of CLOs’ affiliations on the investment ratio for a 12-
month horizon before and after default ( H 12= ). The first column estimates the regression 
model for an unbalanced panel that includes loan positions with a minimum history of 6 months 
before the default date. The remaining four panels focus on a fully balanced sample with a 
complete 12-month history. In general, we observe that the regression findings are very similar 
for the balanced and unbalanced panels. For this reason, our discussion focuses on the balanced 
panel results presented in column 3.  
The bottom part of the table formally investigates the statistical significance of the private-
information Hypotheses 1A and 1B outlined in the previous section. It presents the relevant 
change for the specified hypothesis and indicates the statistical significance of the underlying F-
test. The first test considers whether different types of relationships influence CLO managers’ 
trading activity before default (Hypothesis 1A). The maintained hypothesis is that CLO 
managers would not respond to private news before default, that is 0 BH : 0
ιδ = .14 As suggested by 
the graphical analysis (Figure 3), the change in the pre-default investment ratio for CLO 
managers that have a relationship with borrowers only via their underwriter or syndicate 
participation ( Ptji,hRel  or
U
tji,hRel  ) and for those with no relationships ( tijNORel ) are not 
                                                          
14 Although we formally described the hypothesis using a one-sided framework, in practice the statistical tests need 
to consider the two-sided possibility that the investment ratio can increase or decrease during the specified period. 
The F-test is therefore designed to reject the null hypothesis that the trading response B
ιδ is zero in favor of the 
alternative that it is either positive or negative.  
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statistically significant ( UB = -1.53,δ
P
B = 2.21δ and 
N
B =0.71δ , respectively). The negative response 
on UBδ  suggests that CLO managers may get some unique information through their underwriters, 
but the impact of these relationships is generally statistically insignificant. In contrast, the 
average decline in this 12-month period before default for CLO managers affiliated with the 
arranger of the defaulting loan ( Mtji,hRel ) is 
M
B =-14.1δ  and statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 1B proposes that the sell-off of distressed loans by CLO managers that are 
affiliated with the loan arranger is greater before default than the sell-off before default by the 
remaining CLO managers. Indeed, the average difference between the investment ratio for 
borrowers with CLO manager-loan arranger relationships and those without any relationships is 
M N
B Bδ -δ = -14.82  and statistically significant (Column 3 Table 4, bottom panel).  
These findings are robust. To mitigate possible adverse selection loan biases between the 
relationship groups, we restrict our sample to loans that were granted by the arrangers affiliated 
with CLOs in our sample. As expected, the sample of borrowers in this test is notably smaller, 
declining from 244 firms to 46 firms, but it does not affect our findings (Column 4, Table 4).  
To lessen possible mismatch problems stemming from loan aggregation, we restrict our 
sample to borrowers that have only one loan. Recall that, to avoid the problems stemming from 
the absence of loan identifiers in our data, we focus on CLO managers’ overall investment at the 
borrower level. Restricting the sample to borrowers that have only one loan assures us that CLOs 
are investing in the same loan. Again, the regression results for this test are similar to our 
original findings, albeit somewhat weaker in statistical significance (Column 5, Table 4). 
The evidence unveiled thus far on the strong statistical decline in the investment ratio in the 
period leading up to default is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that CLO managers affiliated with 
the arranger of the defaulting loan use their private information to lower their exposure to 
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distressed borrowers before default. There are, however, other potential explanations for our 
findings. For example, as we can see from Table 4, and in line with the evidence depicted in 
Figure 3, CLO managers affiliated with the loan arranger appear to continue to divest their 
investments in distressed loans after they default. While this sell off may also be information 
driven, given that prices in the secondary loan market stabilize after default (Figure 1), this 
suggests these CLO managers may have a different risk appetite. Before we look closely at some 
alternative explanations to our findings, in the next subsection we briefly discuss some additional 
factors that appear to influence CLO trading. 
4.2 Influence of Other Factors on CLO Trading 
We briefly discuss here the impact of the remaining explanatory variables that we consider in 
our investigation of CLOs’ trading around loan defaults (Table 4, top panel). The large and 
statistically significant impact of ( )log POSITION  signifies that a 10 percent increase (decrease) 
in borrower holdings would increase (decrease) the investment ratio by about 9 percent. The 
coefficient of MATURITY is generally negative, suggesting that collateral managers are more 
inclined to avoid longer maturity loans. While longer duration assets are generally more 
attractive to institutional investors, collateral managers’ portfolio choices might be constrained 
by guidelines in the CLO indenture that govern weighted average life thresholds. As expected, 
credit ratings strongly influence the manager’s willingness to keep a loan. This is evidenced by 
the estimated parameters on the credit rating dummy variables, which change from positive to 
negative as the loan credit rating deteriorates.  
Finally, our results show that CLO managers make larger investments in the loans of 
borrowers in which they also have an equity investment. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of EQUITY_REL indicates that CLO managers retain on average about a 28 percent 
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higher investment ratio on those borrowers that they also have an equity investment. 15 This 
investment ratio commitment remains unchanged before and after default. This result highlights 
that CLO managers like private equity firms, which are more likely to intrinsically purchase their 
subsidiary loans, exhibit no desire to dispose of these distressed assets.  
5. BANK AFFILIATION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The results unveiled in the previous section suggest that CLOs affiliated with loan arrangers 
gain access to private information on borrowers. Our regression findings reveal that CLO 
managers affiliated with loan arrangers lower their exposure to distressed positions before 
default in comparison to non-relationship managers.  In this section we investigate if the trading 
behavior of those managers is influenced by other factors.  
Our sample of CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers is dominated by banks, which is 
to be expected because banks are the dominant arrangers in the syndicated loan market. Given 
that banks are subject to prudential regulation and supervision, and are by extension less prone to 
take on risk, it is possible that their risk conservatism extends to their CLO affiliates  
For example, Chernenko (2017) finds that CDO managers with higher franchise by virtue of 
their affiliation with other businesses were less willing to invest in riskier assets. Other studies 
also highlight the importance of conflicts of interest that amplify reputational and operational 
risks. Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011) show that loan arrangers experiencing greater 
bankruptcies suffer lower rates of participation by investors and attract fewer syndicated loan 
borrower clients. Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) find a significant negative market reaction to 
the announcement of internal fraud losses for firms with strong shareholder rights. 
                                                          
15 The equity relationship variable is a binary indicator of firm ownership constructed from Capital IQ company 
information. The equity ownership measure reflects primarily situations where the manager is a private equity owner 
or a current stakeholder in the firm but excludes 13F share ownerships of listed companies reported to the SEC.  
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To ascertain the importance of bank-specific factors on loan-arranger affiliated CLOs’ 
trading ahead of default, we begin by comparing the reaction of bank- and nonbank-affiliated 
CLOs around default without controlling for the presence of loan relationships using the 
following model: 
H H
B CLO BANK BANK NONBANK NONBANK
tij i t 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h tij
h H h H
R x x Rel Rel .• •
=− =−
= α + α + β + β + δ + δ + e∑ ∑  (2) 
If CLO managers affiliated with banks behave more prudently to avoid adversely impacting their 
affiliated parent franchise value, then they may proactively divest distressed loans before default. 
If that is the case then we should have BANK NONBANK0 B BH : .δ ≤ δ  
The estimates of equation (2) reveal a significant difference in the response between and 
bank- and nonbank-affiliated CLO managers (Table 5, column 1). Bank-affiliated CLO 
managers decrease their average pre-default exposure by BANKB 10.81δ = − . In contrast, nonbank-
affiliated CLO managers slightly increase their pre-default investment ratio in distressed 
borrowers.  
These results are suggestive of a bank-factor. However, since they are based on the entire 
sample of borrowers, and thus include borrowers that have relationships with the CLO manager, 
they may stem from differences in the information available to the CLO manager. To address 
this problem, we restrict our sample to the subset of borrowers that do not have loan 
relationships with the CLO manager or its underwriter. For these borrowers, bank- and nonbank-
affiliated CLOs rely on information provided to all syndicate participants by an unaffiliated loan 
arranger and other public sources. The findings based on this non-relationship subsample 
confirm that there is an incremental response from bank-affiliated CLOs to default that is not 
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observed by nonbank-affiliated CLOs (Table 5, column 2), adding support to the thesis that bank 
affiliates have lower risk appetite.  
To disentangle the relative importance of private information and bank-specific factors 
influencing CLO managers’ trading around loan defaults, we estimate a hybrid of the regression 
specifications (1) and (2): 
H H H H
B CLO M M P P U U N BANK BANK
tij i t 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h









=− =− =− =−
−
=−
= α +α +β +β + δ + δ + δ + δ
+ δ + e
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
      (3) 
This specification decomposes the dummy explanatory variable tijNORel  (for CLO managers 
without any loan relationships) into BANKtijNORel (for CLO managers that are bank-affiliated) and
NONBANK
tijNORel  (for nonbank-affiliated CLO managers). This decomposition is particularly useful 
because there is a large overlap between CLO managers affiliated with arrangers of defaulting 
loans Mtij(Rel 1)=  and CLO managers affiliated with banks that invest in non-relationship loans
BANK
tij(NORel 1)= . Specifically, 37 bank-affiliated CLOs in our sample are managed by 21 unique 
banks (Table 1). Moreover, bank managers that are arrangers (represented by MtijRel 1= ) hold 
about 70 percent of the loans without any relationships (indicated by BANKtijNORel 1= ). 
That overlap provides a useful comparison for testing the importance of private information 
because the trading decisions on loans with and without relationships are made largely by the 
same core group of bank-affiliated CLO managers. Essentially, the regression parameter MBδ  in 
model (3) represents how bank-affiliated CLO managers trade their “own” arranged loans, while 
N BANK
B
−δ indicates how this same set of CLO managers trade non-affiliated loans. If loan 
relationships do not offer any informational advantages before default, then bank-affiliated CLO 
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managers should trade relationship defaulting loans and non-relationship defaulting loans in a 
similar fashion; more precisely, we should find N BANK M0 B BH : −δ = δ . If, on the other hand, CLO 
managers trade their own relationship loans more aggressively in the period leading up to 
default, that will provide support to the idea that they rely on private information. Our results 
support the latter hypothesis (Table 6, bottom half): we find a decline of 24.48 percent in 
positions for CLOs with loan relationships and only a 4.04 percent decline in positions held by 
CLOs having no explicit relationship with the borrower.  
It is possible that loan arrangers, and by association their affiliated CLO managers, are more 
averse to holding their arranged problem loans. Absent this possibility, the latest findings 
showing that bank-affiliated CLO managers are more aggressive at divesting loans arranged by 
their bank that fall into distress (when compared to loans that also fall into distress but which 
were not arranged by their bank) provide important support to the thesis that CLO managers 
affiliated with loan arrangers gain access to unique information on borrowers.  
 The latest results are important for yet another reason: they alleviate those concerns that our 
findings are driven by CLO managers’ loan re-pricing policies.  CLO collateral normally values 
securities at par to avoid the unnecessary problems that come with mark-to-market volatility. 
However, CLO managers are expected to re-price their collateral at the fair market value or 
recovery value in the event of default. Arguably, the apparent drop in investment ratio in the 
months leading up to default could stem from loan re-pricing rather than loan sales. This drop, 
however, would require CLO managers to follow different practices depending on whether the 
loan was arranged by their affiliated bank or by another institution, which is unlikely. 
Further, in addition to providing information of CLO positions, the Moody’s database that 
we use also includes a separate module tracing CLOs’ trading transactions. One drawback with 
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the transactions data is that it is mostly compiled from independent trustee reports without 
common loan identifiers to link with the positions’ information. Nevertheless, using the available 
loan identifier or loan facility names, we were able to merge a significant segment of the CLO 
positions and transactions data. Overall, this exercise reveals that most of the nontrivial changes 
in loan positions are associated with specific trading transactions. It is also interesting to note 
that managers sometimes report the primary reason for the transaction. About 82 percent of the 
trading activity is discretionary and is related to the credit deterioration or improvement of the 
loan asset. The remaining trading activity is nondiscretionary, triggered mostly by corporate 
restructuring, debt refinancing, redemptions, and loan exchanges.   
7. CONCLUSION 
The originate-to-distribute model of securitization is an important innovation in financial 
intermediation. This paper focuses on CLOs, which enable lenders to originate and distribute 
loans to investors. We use a unique database of CLO trading transactions to investigate the 
impact of the institutional affiliations of CLO managers on their trading activity. Our analysis 
focuses on the trading behavior of CLO managers affiliated with loan arrangers, a connection 
that may give them access to private information held by the loan arranger.  
Our regression analysis, examining CLO managers’ trading of loans to borrowers that 
default, reveals that CLO managers affiliated with the arranger of these loans (mostly banks) sell 
large portions of their positions before default. In contrast, CLO managers that do not have a 
similar affiliation do not divest their exposures.  
This finding is consistent with the thesis that bank-affiliated CLO managers are more risk 
conservative, possibly to protect the franchise value of their parent institutions, as well as the 
thesis that bank-affiliated CLO managers gain access to private information by virtue of their 
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parent role in the syndicated loan market. While we cannot rule out either one of these 
explanations, we unveil evidence in support of the information thesis.   
Our paper suggests some fruitful topics for future research. For example, given that prices in 
the secondary loan market decline significantly in the months leading up to default, there is 
likely value in a preemptive sell off strategy. However, it is unclear from our investigation 
whether this strategy has a positive effect on CLOs’ performance. As additional data on CLOs 
becomes available, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of CLO manager’s affiliation 
on performance.  
Our sample overlaps significantly with the 2008 financial crisis, which was characterized by 
a significant rise in corporate defaults. This period provides a useful laboratory for examining the 
trading behavior of CLO managers around default, but the crisis may have had a unique impact 
on their trading strategies. Therefore, another fruitful topic for future research is to investigate 
the impact of CLO managers’ relationships with loan arrangers on their trading activity during 
normal times. Yet another potentially interesting area for future research is to investigate whether 
the selloffs by bank-affiliated CLO managers that we identified constraint parent banks’ ability 
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Table 1. Collateral manager distribution of the CLO sample, 2007-2011 
  







Institutions Default Rate 
Collateral Manager Type      
Banks 55 23.01 500 22 0.19 
Hedge Funds 31 12.97 487 18 0.26 
Insurance Firms 19 7.95 423 5 0.29 
Investment Firms 98 41.00 494 43 0.22 
PE Firms 36 15.06 484 12 0.28 
 
239   100 
 CLO Underwriter Type      
Banks 239     
      
Number of Borrowers 5,039     
Panel Size 1,471,565 
  
 




Notes: The table presents basic summary statistics for the entire cross-sectional time series 
sample of CLOs. Default rate = the fraction of borrowers that experienced default during the 
sample period. Number of institutions = unique number of firms that manage the CLOs. Number 





  Table 2. Summary Statistics for Panel Sample of Defaulted Borrowers, 2007-2011 
REGRESSION VARIABLES 
(Panel index dimensions: month (t), CLO (j), borrower (i)) 
Mean Median 1st  Pctl 99th Pctl 
    DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
Investment Ratio tijR = Aggregate position held at month (t) 
divided by the initial position (t=0) (percent) 
136.9 99.24 0.21 10,000 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES     
Borrower/Loan Characteristics Btijx •      
POSITION = Nominal position held ($ millions) 3.81 2.41 0.002 25.75 
US_FIRM = 1 if borrower is US domiciled 0.95    
%ISSUE_OWNED = Percent of entire issue owned by CLO 4.25 0.25 0.0022 37.9 
MATURITY = Weighted remaining loan maturity (years) 4.25 4.00 0.050 7.00 
EQUITY_REL = 1 if manager has equity relationships with 
borrower  
 
0.04    
Rating Indicators     
AAA to BBB- 0.0003    
BB+ 0.0024    
BB 0.0151    
BB- 0.0163    
B+ 0.0580    
B 0.2029    
B- 0.2177    
CCC+ 0.2484    
CCC 0.1108    
CCC- 0.0718    
CC+ to C 0.0563 
 
   
Manager-Borrower Loan Relationships     
No Relationship, tjiNORel  0.67    
Manager is loan arranger, MtjiRel  0.03    
Underwriter is loan arranger UtjiRel  0.19    
Underwriter or manager are loan participants PtjiRel
 
0.11    
CLO Characteristics CLOtjx •      









 Number of Defaulted Borrowers in Panel 376    
Number of Observations in Panel 148,486    
Notes: This table summarizes the explanatory and dependent variables of the regression sample. 
All continuous explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percentile level. The actual 
size of the various regression samples is smaller because of the pertinent subsets of borrowers. 



















  Total 
%Column 
Manager is arranger  
                  
                  
Number 201 3 0 9 2 215 
%Row 93.49 1.4 0 4.19 0.93 
 %Column 9.28 0.19 0 0.18 0.12 1.93 
Manager is participant    
or underwriter is 
participant 
                  
Number 265 169 98 588 133 1,253 
%Row 21.15 13.49 7.82 46.93 10.61  
%Column 12.23 10.56 12.25 12 8.12 18.08 
Underwriter is arranger  
                  
                  
Number 395 346 124 896 247 2,008 
%Row 19.67 17.23 6.18 44.62 12.3  
%Column 18.24 21.63 15.5 18.29 15.08 11.28 
No relationship   
                  
                  
Number 1305 1082 578 3,407 1,256 7,628 
%Row 17.11 14.18 7.58 44.66 16.47  
%Column 60.25 67.63 72.25 69.53 76.68 68.71 
Total             
                  
Total 2,166 1,600 800 4,900 1,638 11,104 
%Row 19.51 14.41 7.2 44.13 14.75 100 
 
Notes. The table cross-tabulates the frequency of defaulted borrower relationships by 




Table 4. Influence of loan relationships on investment ratio 12-months before and after default (balanced 
panel borrowers)  
12 12 12 12
B CLO M M P P U U N
tij t i 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h tij
h 12 h 12 h 12 h 12
R x x Rel Rel Rel NORel .• •
=− =− =− =−
= α +α +β +β + δ + δ + δ + δ + e∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
Dependent variable: Borrower investment ratio tijR (percent) 
 
Unbalanced 



















      Log(POSITION) 69.27*** 73.11*** 93.27*** 112.25*** 81.57*** 
 
(117.90) (101.66) (116.64) (78.50) (82.70) 
%ISSUE_OWNED -2.32*** -2.64*** -1.80*** -2.06*** -1.51*** 
 
(-25.55) (-27.30) (-14.01) (-6.19) (-9.40) 
MATURITY -2.22*** -1.53*** 0.08 -14.15*** 0.22 
 
(-6.49) (-4.98) (0.18) (-10.64) (0.37) 
US _FIRM -4.72* -9.27*** -8.36** -9.29 -15.13*** 
 
(-1.87) (-2.89) (-2.43) (-1.19) (-2.62) 
EQUITY_REL 14.64*** 17.16*** 28.75*** 22.53*** 29.02*** 
 (9.55) (8.59) (12.78) (6.10) (10.72) 
CLO_BALANCE -0.03*** -0.03***    
 
(-36.80) (-25.31)    
AAA to BBB- 20.09*** -2.59 0.95 8.77 -6.83 
 
(3.13) (-0.65) (0.32) (0.86) (-0.61) 
BB+ 4.06 20.78*** 31.53*** 64.72*** -20.89*** 
 
(0.91) (3.64) (5.61) (6.28) (-2.93) 
BB -8.48*** -7.43* 0.45 -10.36* 3.94 
 
(-2.61) (-1.82) (0.11) (-1.73) (0.77) 
BB- 19.61*** 13.43*** 20.35*** 27.59*** 15.73*** 
 
(10.22) (6.27) (9.35) (7.58) (6.23) 
B+ 1.40 2.47 8.67*** 6.31** 7.65*** 
 
(1.07) (1.60) (5.48) (2.17) (4.07) 
B 1.72 2.43* 5.59*** 4.81* 3.76** 
 
(1.54) (1.88) (4.16) (1.79) (2.47) 
B- -1.23 -0.08 2.67** 0.96 -0.40 
 
(-1.20) (-0.06) (2.10) (0.36) (-0.27) 
CCC+ 0.40 0.84 5.80*** 1.26 3.05* 
 
(0.33) (0.60) (4.02) (0.39) (1.92) 
CCC -1.61 -0.38 2.87* 3.81 3.80** 
 
(-1.20) (-0.25) (1.77) (1.07) (2.19) 
CCC- -9.87*** -1.96 0.13 0.86 0.31 
 
(-6.22) (-1.16) (0.07) (0.18) (0.15) 
CC to C -13.76*** -6.13** -1.82 -6.98 0.63 
 (-5.55) (-2.14) (-0.61) (-1.15) (0.18) 
34 
 




Manager-arranger relationships MB 0δ ≤  -11.49*** -25.25*** -14.10*** -1.63 -16.04*** 
Managers with participant relationships
P
B 0δ ≤  2.84 4.96** 2.21 10.03*** 10.79*** 
Managers with no relationships NB 0δ ≤  2.64*** 0.99 0.71 5.15** 0.99 
Managers with underwriter relationships
U
B 0δ ≤  0.95 1.14 -1.53 -0.54 -4.68** 
Hypothesis 1B. Who is more responsive 
before default? 
B B
ι κδ − δ  
Manager-arranger more responsive than 
participant M PB B 0δ − δ ≤  
-14.34*** -30.21*** -16.31*** -11.66* -26.84*** 
Manager-arranger more responsive than 
no-relationship manager M NB B 0δ − δ ≤  
 
-14.13*** -26.24*** -14.82*** -6.79 -17.03*** 
Manager-arranger more responsive than 
underwriter manager M UB B 0δ − δ ≤  
-12.44*** -26.39*** -12.57*** -1.09 -11.37** 
Post-Default Response, MAδ  -19.20*** -30.10*** -19.01*** -8.88* -19.45*** 
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CLO deal Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Month Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number Observations 141,124 92,340 92,340 46,019 49,863 
Number of Borrowers 374 0.26 244 46 229 
 2R  0.23 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.35 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression estimates of the investment ratio regression model formally defined 
by equation (1). The first column summarizes the regression estimates for an unbalanced panel that assumes 
the borrower had a minimum of 6-month history before and after the event of default. The remaining columns 
present the regression results based on a balanced sample of borrowers that had at least 12-month history 
before and after default. Column (4) estimates the model for only borrowers that have an extant loan 
relationship with CLO managers. The last column examines only single loan positions. The hypothesis tests 
panel presents the average value of the maintained hypothesis with its corresponding F-value significance. The 
null hypotheses of B 0ιδ ≤ or B B 0ι κδ − δ ≤ are accepted when the values are negative and statistically significant. 
When the values are positive and statistically significant the null is rejected in favor of the alternative. The 
regression panel model was estimated using a GLS feasible approach that corrects for borrower clustered error 
heteroskedasticity (Cameron and Miller 2015). The symbols (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical 
significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent level. 
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Table 5. Importance of regulatory structure: Response of bank and nonbank managers  
12 12
B CLO BANK BANK NONBANK NONBANK
tij i t 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h tij
h 12 h 12
R x x Rel Rel .• •
=− =−
= α + α + β + β + δ + δ + e∑ ∑  
Dependent variable: Borrower investment ratio tijR (percent) 













Log(POSITION) 73.19*** 68.90*** 87.05*** 
 
(102.05) (89.76) (64.42) 
%ISSUE_OWNED -2.62*** -2.22*** -2.97*** 
 
(-26.77) (-22.38) (-10.38) 
MATURITY -1.51*** -0.45 -5.45*** 
 
(-4.93) (-1.45) (-7.26) 
US _FIRM -9.01*** -7.33** -9.67 
 
(-2.83) (-2.20) (-1.38) 
EQUITY_REL  16.52*** 25.80*** -3.47 
 
(8.30) (11.94) (-0.82) 
CLO Balance -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (-15.6) (-15.6) (-10.52) 
AAA to BBB- -3.31 -4.38 -3.47 
 
(-0.84) (-1.12) (-0.82) 
BB+ 19.94*** 11.50 -5.17 
 
(3.50) (1.61) (-0.16) 
BB -7.32* -1.21 31.30*** 
 
(-1.79) (-0.26) (3.78) 
BB- 13.73*** 9.15*** -7.20 
 
(6.41) (4.02) (-1.16) 
B+ 2.49 1.36 18.17*** 
 
(1.62) (0.83) (4.77) 
B 2.31* 1.23 3.43 
 
(1.79) (0.94) (1.22) 
B- -0.15 0.43 5.38** 
 
(-0.12) (0.35) (2.20) 
CCC+ 0.89 0.68 -0.95 
 
(0.64) (0.49) (-0.41) 
CCC -0.16 0.94 -0.20 
 
(-0.11) (0.62) (-0.07) 
CCC- -2.21 -2.40 -4.45 
 
(-1.29) (-1.46) (-1.41) 
CC to C -5.65** -8.08** 7.84*** 
 
(-1.98) (-2.62) (2.72) 
Table continues next page    
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Hypothesis 1A.  Are managers selling before 
default? B
ιδ  
Bank Managers BANKB 0δ ≤  -10.81*** -3.80** -14.34*** 
Nonbank Managers NONBANKB 0δ ≤  0.32 0.06 -0.37 
    
Hypothesis 1B. Who is more responsive before 
default? 
BANK NONBANK
B Bδ − δ  
Bank Managers vs Nonbank Managers 
BANK NONBANK
B B 0δ − δ ≤  
-11.13*** -3.87** -13.97*** 
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Month Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number Observations 92,340 61,934 30,406 
Number of Borrowers 244 233 102 
 
 
2R   0.26 0.30 0.27 
 
Notes: The table summarizes the regression estimates of the investment ratio specification defined by 
equation (2). The sample is limited only to a balanced panel of borrowers that had a 12-month history 
before and after default. This regression specification does not include CLO deal fixed effects 
because they are correlated with the bank and non-bank indicators. The regression panel was 
estimated using a GLS feasible approach that accounts for borrower clustered error heteroskedasticity 
(Cameron and Miller 2015). The hypothesis tests panel presents the average value of the maintained 
hypothesis with its corresponding F-value significance. The null hypotheses of B 0ιδ ≤ or B B 0ι κδ − δ ≤
are accepted when the values are negative and statistically significant. When the values are positive 
and statistically significant the null is rejected in favor of the alternative. The symbols (*), (**), and 




Table 6. Evidence from borrowers without any loan relationships  
12 12 12
B CLO M M P P U U
tij i t 1 tij 2 tj h tij,h h tij,h h tij,h
h 12 h 12 h 1212 12
N BANK BANK N NONBANK NONBANK
h tij,h h tij,h tij
h 12 h 12






= α +α +β +β + δ + δ + δ +




Dependent variable: Borrower investment ratio tijR (percent) 















CLO Balance -0.03*** 
 
(-25.31) 




































Hypothesis 1A. Are managers selling before default?   
Manager-arranger relationships MB 0δ ≤  -25.48*** 
Managers with participant relationships PB 0δ ≤  -4.78** 
Bank managers without relationships N BANKSB 0−δ ≤  -4.04 
Nonbank managers without relationships N NONBANKSB 0−δ ≤  1.76 
Managers with underwriter relationships UB 0δ ≤  -3.65 
Hypothesis 1B. Who is more responsive before default?  B Bι κδ − δ  
Manager-arranger vs banks without relationships
M N BANK
B B 0
−δ − δ ≤  -21.44*** 
Manager-arranger vs nonbanks without relationships
M N NONBANK
B B 0
−δ − δ ≤  -5.79*** 
Without relationships: bank vs nonbank N BANK N NONBANKB B 0− −δ − δ ≤  -27.23*** 
Post-Default Response  
Manager-arranger relationships, MAδ  -30.25*** 
Bank managers without relationships, N BANKA −δ  -3.63 
Nonbank managers without relationships, N NONBANKA −δ  1.82 
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes 
Year and Month Time Effects Yes 
Number Observations 92,340 
Number of Borrowers 244 
2R   0.26 
 
Notes: The regression presents the regression estimates of the investment ratio regression model formally 
defined by equation (3). The specification focuses on the borrowers without existing loan relationships with 
CLO managers and underwriters. The sample is limited only to a balanced panel of borrowers that had 
12-month history before and after default. This regression specification does not include CLO deal 
fixed effects because they are correlated with the bank and non-bank indicators. The regression panel 
model was estimated using a GLS feasible approach that accounts for borrower clustered error 
heteroskedasticity (Cameron and Miller 2015). The hypothesis tests panel presents the average value of the 
maintained hypothesis with its corresponding F-value significance. The null hypotheses of B 0
ιδ ≤ or 
B B 0
ι κδ − δ ≤ are accepted when the values are negative and statistically significant. When the values are positive 
and statistically significant the null is rejected in favor of the alternative. The symbols (*), (**), and (***) 




Figure 1. Secondary Loan Trading Prices Before and After Default 
(Price at Default = 100) 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the average secondary loan price before and after default.  






























Trading Days From Default 
40 
 




Notes: The figure traces the average investment ratio position held by collateral manager type for the 






Figure 3. Predicted investment ratio hR̂




Notes: The figure traces the regression predicted investment ratio around default by the manager-
underwriter relationship types. The prediction traces the investment ratio for the sample average for 
each relationship type defined by B CLOh i t 1 2 h hˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆR x x
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